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It is becoming increasingly common for lessees to receive contributions from 
lessors towards leasehold improvements costs. A lessee will be entitled to 
claim an allowance in terms of section 11(g), where expenditure has actually 
been incurred in pursuance of an obligation in terms of a lease agreement, 
and the property is used for the production of income. Obstacles arise where 
the lessee either receives a payment or benefit, in cash or otherwise from the 
lessor, either as consideration for the lessee to effect the improvements or as 
inducement for the lessee to enter into the lease agreement. The nature of 
these payments or benefits received by the lessee for income tax purposes 
needs to be assessed with reference to the general principles laid down by 
the South African courts in respect of the “gross income” definition and 
international case law dealing with the income tax treatment of similar 
payments made by the lessor to the lessee. Factors also need to be identified, 
which should be taken into account to assess the income tax nature of these 
payments or benefits. The terms of the agreement in terms of which such 
payments or benefits are made should clearly state the purpose thereof, and 
a conclusive answer will depend on the particular circumstances and facts of 
each case. The interaction between a payment or benefit received by a lessee 
and the availability of a leasehold improvements allowance in terms of section 
11(g) is a complex matter and it remains to be seen how South African courts 
will deal with these issues. 
 
  
Die inkomstebelastingaard van bydraes ontvang deur die 
huurder met betrekking tot huurverbeteringe 
 
Dit raak toenemend algemeen dat huurders ŉ bydrae tot huur verbetering 
koste vanaf verhuurders ontvang. ŉ Huurder sal geregtig wees om ŉ artikel 
11(g) toelaag te eis, waar onkostes werklik aangegaan is ter voldoening aan ŉ 
verpligting ingevolge die huurooreenkoms en die eiendom word gebruik vir die 
voortbrenging van inkomste. Struikelblokke ontstaan waar die huurder ŉ 
bedrag of voordeel, in kontant of andersins ontvang vanaf die verhuurder, as 
vergoeding vir die aanbring van verbeteringe of as beweegrede om die 
huurooreenkoms te sluit. Die inkomstebelastingaard van hierdie bedrae of 
voordele ontvang moet beoordeel word met verwysing na die algemene 
beginsels ontwikkel deur die Suid-Afrikaanse howe met betrekking tot die 
“bruto inkomste” definisie en internasionale hofsake wat handel met die 
inkomstebelastinghantering van soortgelyke betalings vanaf die verhuurder 
aan die huurder. Faktore moet ook identifiseer word wat inag geneem moet 
word ten einde die aard van hierdie bedrae of voordele vas te stel. Die terme 
van die ooreenkoms ingevolge waarvan die bedrag of voordeel ontvang word, 
moet duidelik die doel daarvan uiteensit. ŉ Beslissende antwoord sal afhang 
van die spesifieke omstandighede en feite van elke geval. Die interaksie 
tussen ŉ betaling of voordeel ontvang deur die huurder en die beskikbaarheid 
van ŉ huurverbeteringe toelaag ingevolge artikel 11(g) is ŉ komplekse 
onderwerp en daar sal nog gesien moet word hoe die Suid-Afrikaanse howe 




Taxpayers are often faced with the choice of buying or leasing property to 
carry on their business operations. Many factors may influence this decision 
and each option has its own benefits and disadvantages. Where a taxpayer 
decides to lease property, such property is often not suitable and 
improvements are required to convert and equip the property to a suitable 
condition prior to commencing business operations. Depending on the 
financial position of the lessee and lessor and the nature of the improvements, 
the parties will decide who will be responsible for effecting the improvements 
and incurring the related costs.  
 
There is an increasing tendency that lease agreements place contractual 
obligations on lessors to make payments or grant benefits to lessees, either 
as reimbursement for the improvements effected or as inducement for 
entering into the lease agreement. This article will focus on instances where a 
lessee is responsible for effecting improvements to the leased property, and 
will consider the circumstances where the lessor remunerates the lessee in 
cash or otherwise.  
 
The amounts payable to the lessee may be in the form of: 
 
• A rent inducement payment; 
 
• Reimbursement of the leasehold improvements expenditure through a 
tenant installation allowance; and 
 
• Granting of the free right of use of the leased property until all the 
leasehold improvements expenditure have been recovered by the lessee. 
 
These payments and benefits cause many uncertainties, not only with regard 
to the income tax nature thereof, but also with regard to the availability of the 
leasehold improvements allowance in terms of section 11(g). 
 
The writer could not find any South African case law that deals with these 
issues simultaneously, nor could South African case law be found that deals 
with the income tax treatment of these payments or benefits in the hands of 
the lessee. There is however international case law which deals with the 
nature of rent inducement payments in the hands of the lessee. 
 
Not many commentators and tax experts have expressed their views on the 
potential income tax implications of these payments or benefits receivable by 
a lessee. There are however articles by, amongst others, Clegg, D., 
Meyerowitz, S.C. and Croome, B. 
 
2. Objective and scope of the paper 
 
The problem statements to be examined in this article are as follows: 
 
• Whether the lessee will be entitled to claim a leasehold improvements 
allowance, where the lessor makes a payment or grants a benefit to the 
lessee, either as reimbursement of the leasehold improvements 
expenditure or as inducement for entering into the lease agreement? 
 
• What is the nature of these payments or benefits in the hands of the 
lessee? 
 
3. Research method 
 
The research method to be adopted consists of a literature review and 
application through case studies. South African income tax legislation, South 
African case law, international case law, opinions expressed in articles as 
written by South African tax experts and commentators and textbooks are 
referred to in order to analyse the interaction between section 11(g) and 
payments or benefits received by a lessee. 
 
4. Requirements of section 11(g) 
 
Leasehold improvements generally constitute construction or improvements 
effected to a building or premises, which are required by the lessee, 
subsequent to the approval from the lessor.1 A need for leasehold 
                                               
1
 Cornelissen, C. De Rebus – SA Attorneys’ Journal. Taxation and lease agreements. March 2010. 
improvements typically arise where vacant land or a building is leased, which 
requires specific buildings or items to customise the land or building according 
to the requirements of the lessee. The need for leasehold improvements may 
also arise where the lessor does not want to incur costs upfront or is not 
financially capable of incurring such costs. Section 11(g) was introduced to 
clarify the income tax position for the lessee. Conversely, paragraph (h) was 
inserted into the gross income definition in section 1 to deal with the income 
tax consequences for the lessor.2 
 
Section 11(g) reads as follow: 
 
11...For the purpose of determining the taxable income derived by any 
person...shall be allowed as deductions from the income of such person so 
derived… 
  
(g) an allowance in respect of any expenditure actually incurred by the 
taxpayer, in pursuance of an obligation to effect improvements on land or to 
buildings, incurred under an agreement whereby the right of use or 
occupation of the land or buildings is granted by any other person, where the 
land or buildings are used or occupied for the production of income or income 
is derived therefrom… (Emphasis added) 
 
The following key requirements can be identified, which all need to be 
complied with in order for the lessee to claim a section 11(g) leasehold 
improvements allowance: 
 
• There must be a lease agreement; 
 
• There must be an obligation to effect improvements in terms of the lease 
agreement; 
 
                                               
2
 Paragraph (h) of the gross income definition in section 1 will only be briefly mentioned, in the context of 
the requirements of section 11(g) (refer to section 11(g)(vi) of the ITA. 
• There must be expenditure actually incurred in pursuance of such 
obligation; and 
 
• The land or building must be used or occupied for the production of 
income or income must be derived there from. 
 
A further requirement is that the value of the leasehold improvements or the 
amount to be expended on such improvements should constitute income in 
the hands of the lessor.  
 
The requirements of section 11(g) are clear and unambiguous, but the 
practical application thereof may be problematic in certain instances.  
 
4.1 Lease agreement 
 
It is possible in terms of law of contract principles to conclude an enforceable 
oral lease agreement, but it is submitted that for purposes of claiming a 
section 11(g) leasehold improvements allowance, that the lease agreement 
should be reduced to writing. This will ease the burden of proof for the lessee, 
if the deduction thereof is ever be challenged. 
 
4.2 In pursuance of an obligation in terms of the lease agreement 
 
The Natal Special Court had to specifically decide on whether this 
requirement was met in ITC 1615.3 The lease agreement in this case 
contained the following provision:4 
 
…the lessee undertakes and agrees and shall be obliged...to erect such new 
buildings and/or effect such improvements...upon the leased property...at its 
own sole cost and expense… (Emphasis added) 
 
                                               
3
 (1990) 59 SATC 264. 
4
 At 268. 
The CIR contended that: 
 
• the obligation contained in the lease agreement was void for vagueness; 
 
• there was no obligation on the lessee to effect the improvements, nor did 
the lessee incur expenditure in pursuance of an obligation; and 
 
• the phrase “shall be obliged” did not relate to the improvements but to the 
costs that the lessee was obliged to bear.5  
 
Galgut J, President of the Special Court stated that the determination of an 
obligation depends on the correct interpretation of the provision in the lease 
agreement, and that an obligation can only exist if the provision does not 
leave it to the discretion of the lessee to effect the improvements or not.6 The 
following test was laid down in this case:7 
 
It is only if it gives the lessor the right to demand the improvements that it can 
be said that the lessee is burdened with an obligation to effect them. The test, 
so the cases say, is whether upon refusal by the lessee to effect the 
improvements the lessor will have the right to approach a court for an order 
for specific performance or for damages in lieu thereof. (Emphasis added) 
 
It was held that “shall be obliged” referred to the need to effect improvements, 
and once it is clear that the lessor has a need that improvements should be 
effected, an obligation for the lessee is created and the lessor may demand 
that the improvements are effected. Upon failure by the lessee to effect such 
improvement, the lessor may sue for specific performance.8   
 
In ITC 1188,9 Margo J, President of the Transvaal Special Court had to decide 
whether an obligation to effect improvements arose where the right of 
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occupation was conditional upon the lessee effecting such improvements, as 
the lease agreement did not contain an express obligation for the lessee.10 
The SIR contended that it was essential that the obligation to effect 
improvements in terms of section 11(g), should be legally enforceable and 
that its breach should entitle the lessor to sue for specific performance or 
damages.11 The court held as follow with regard to this contention:12 
 
I doubt whether it was intended in either of these cases to lay down that it 
was an essential characteristic of an obligation to effect improvements...that 
the breach thereof should found a claim for specific performance or damages. 
The reference to these remedies seems to me to have been merely 
descriptive of the requirement of enforceability. It is certainly a fundamental 
characteristic of an obligation in the present case that it should be legally 
enforceable. 
 
The court held that the lessee may have an obligation to effect improvements 
even in the absence of a right of the lessor to sue for specific performance or 
damages. The lessee does however have to establish that a legally 
enforceable obligation to effect the improvements was incurred. The court 
concluded that the fact that a lease agreement can be terminated upon failure 
by the lessee to effect improvements does not create a legally enforceable 
obligation.13 
 
There should however be a clear and unambiguous obligation on the lessee 
in terms of the lease agreement, to effect the leasehold improvements.14 It 
also not required that the obligation should be an expressed or explicit term of 
the lease agreement, and it may therefore be an implied or tacit term of the 
lease agreement.15 
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If the lessee does not have an obligation to effect the leasehold 
improvements, it will be regarded as being voluntarily undertaken, and the 
lessee will not be entitled to claim a leasehold improvements allowance in 
terms of section 11(g). 
 
Compliance with this requirement is a question of fact. It is however submitted 
that where there is a breach of contract where the lessee does not effect the 
improvements and the lessor is entitled to sue for specific performance or 
damages, this may be indicative that this requirement has been met. In order 
to determine whether there is an obligation on the lessee, it will be helpful to 
establish whether the lessor has any legal mechanism to force the lessee to 
effect the improvements.  
 
The intention of the lessee and lessor at the time when the lease agreement 
was concluded is an essential factor in establishing whether there is an 
obligation on the lessee to effect improvements. This will be relevant where 
there is no express obligation in the lease agreement or where an oral lease 
agreement was concluded. If the intention of the parties and their subsequent 
behaviour indicates that there is an obligation on the lessee to effect the 
improvements, then value should be attached to this intention. 
 
Bearing in mind the contradictory decisions in ITC 1615 (1996) and ITC 1188 
(1972), it is submitted that the prudent approach should be followed and that a 
clear and unambiguous obligation on the lessee to effect the improvements, 
should be evident from the terms of a written lease agreement.  
 
4.3 Expenditure actually incurred 
 
The third requirement of section 11(g) that should be met is that the lessee 
should actually incur expenditure for leasehold improvements, in pursuance of 
an obligation in terms of the lease agreement. 
 
The term “expenditure actually incurred” has been dealt with in a number of 
cases in the context of section 11(a). In order to determine the meaning of this 
phrase for purposes of section 11(g), the principles laid down by South 
African courts in the context of section 11(a) will be applied, as case law 
dealing with this term in the context of section 11(g) could not be found. 
 
The meaning that should therefore be afforded to the term “expenditure 
actually incurred” is “expenditure really incurred” or “expenditure for which the 
taxpayer has in fact become liable for”. Therefore, as long as the lessee has 
an unconditional liability to incur leasehold improvements expenditure, or the 
lessee has in fact incurred leasehold improvements costs, in pursuance of an 
obligation in terms of the lease agreement, this requirement of section 11(g) 
should be met. 
 
4.4 For the production of income or income is derived there from 
 
The fourth requirement of section 11(g), is that the expenditure actually 
incurred for the leasehold improvements, in pursuance of an obligation in 
terms of the lease agreement, should be for the production of the lessee’s 
income or the lessee should derive income there from.  
 
As noted above in the context of “expenditure actually incurred”, the meaning 
of “for the production of income” should be considered in the context of case 
law dealing with section 11(a). The general deduction formula in section 11(a) 
contains a similar requirement, i.e. “in the production of income”, and it is 
submitted that these cases would be equally relevant in the context of section 
11(g). 
 
The only difference between the section 11(g) and the section 11(a) 
requirements being, the use of the word “for” instead of the word “in”. In the 
writer’s view this difference relate to expenses being incurred in the 
furtherance of the business operations of a taxpayer and such operations 
produces income (section 11(a)), in comparison to expenses (normally capital 
in nature) incurred for purposes of the income earning structure of the 
taxpayer and such structure is utilised for the production of income (section 
11(g)) (Emphasis added). 
 It is submitted that for purposes of section 11(g), that this requirement will be 
met, as long as the leased property is used by the lessee for purposes of 
producing income, this requirement should be met. 
 
The alternative requirement of “income is derived therefrom”, in the writer’s 
view refers to instances where the lessee derives income in the form of rental, 
from the leased building or land to which the improvements were effected. 
 
4.5 Value of leasehold improvements or amount to be expended 
should be included in the income of the lessor 
 
The final requirement of section 11(g) that should be met is that the value of 
the improvements, or the amount to be expended on such improvements 
should constitute income in the hands of the lessor.16 To the extent that the 
lessor’s income is exempt from income tax in terms of section 10, or where 
the lessor is a non-resident that does not derive any income or deemed 
source income from South Africa, the value of the leasehold improvements or 
the amount to be expended thereon will not constitute income in the lessor’s 
hands, and the lessee will not be entitled to claim a leasehold improvements 
allowance. 
 
The following amounts will be included in the gross income of the lessor in 
terms of paragraph (h) of the gross income definition in section 1: 
 
• Where an amount is stipulated in the lease agreement, the value of the 
improvements or the amount to be expended on the improvements; or 
 
• Where no amount is stipulated in the lease agreement, an amount 
representing the fair and reasonable value of the improvements. 
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 Section 11(g)(vi) of the ITA. 
It is the practice of SARS to include the relevant amount in the gross income 
of the lessor in the year of assessment in which the improvements have been 
completed, but on a strict reading of paragraph (h) of the gross income 
definition in terms of section 1, the lessor should be taxed upon conclusion of 
the lease agreement.17 The amount included in the lessor’s gross income will 
be deemed to form part of the base cost of its property.18  
 
In order to ensure that this requirement is met, it is submitted that written 
confirmation of the income tax status of the parties to the lease agreement 
should be obtained, prior to concluding the lease agreement. 
 
4.6 Deduction of leasehold improvements expenditure in terms of 
section 11(g) 
 
Once all of the above requirements of section 11(g) have been met, the 
lessee will be allowed to claim a leasehold improvements allowance, in the 
manner set out below: 
 
• The allowance is limited to the amount stipulated in the lease agreement 
as the value of such improvements or the amount to be expended on the 
improvements.19 
 
• Where no amount is stipulated in the lease agreement, the allowance may 
not exceed an amount which in the opinion of the C:SARS represents the 
fair and reasonable value of such improvements.20 
 
• The allowance is calculated as equal annual instalments over the period of 
the lease agreement, but is limited to 25 years.21  
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 Huxham&Haupt, Notes on South African Income Tax [29th Edition] at 201. 
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 Paragraph 20 of the Eight Schedule to the ITA. 
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 Expenses incurred in excess of the amount stipulated in the lease agreement, will be regarded as 
being voluntarily incurred, and the lessee will not be entitled to claim such excess portion in terms of 
section 11(g). 
20
 Section 11(g)(i) of the ITA. 
 • Where the property is not used by the lessee for the full year, the 
allowance is proportionately reduced by the C:SARS,22 but is not 
proportionately reduced where the property does not produce income for 
the full year, due to the termination of the lease agreement.23 
 
• The lessee may also be entitled to a building allowance in terms of section 
13, in addition to the leasehold improvements allowance.24 
 
5 Nature of amount received by or accruing to a lessee 
 
5.1 Gross Income definition 
 
Gross income is defined in section 1 of the ITA as follows: 
 
“gross income”, in relation to any year or period of assessment, means – 
(i) in the case of any resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, 
received by or accrued to or in favour of such resident; or 
(ii) in the case of any person other than a resident, the total amount, in cash 
or otherwise, received by or accrued to or in favour of such person from a 
source within or deemed to be within the Republic, 
during such year or period of assessment, excluding receipts or accruals of a 
capital nature... 
 
The writer will deal with the following elements of the gross income definition, 
separately below: 
 
• There must be an amount, in cash or otherwise; 
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 Section 11(g)(ii) of the ITA. The number of years is calculated from the date on which the 
improvements have been completed, and it is the practice of SARS not to take into account any 
extended period of the lease. 
22
 De Koker, A.P. Silke on South African Income Tax. Electronic version. Updated January 2010. At § 
8.71. 
23
 Section 11(g)(vii) of the ITA. 
24
 The section 11(g) allowance will be limited to the cost of the building or improvements, reduced by 
any untaxed recoupment set off against such costs and the total allowances claimed in terms of section 
13 (section 11(g)(iv) of the ITA). 
 • Received by or accrued to or in favour of the recipient; and  
 
• It must not be of a capital nature. 
 
All of these elements should be present before an amount may be treated as 
gross income in the hands of the recipient thereof. 
 
For non-residents, only receipts and accruals derived from a source within or 
deemed to be within South Africa will be included in gross income (i.e. source 
principle). It is submitted that the source of the payments or benefits received 
by the lessee, will not affect the nature thereof. 
 
5.1.1 An amount in cash or otherwise 
 
It has been held that “amount” should be given a wider meaning and must 
include money and the value of every form of property earned by a taxpayer, 
whether corporeal or incorporeal, which has a money value.25 The onus of 
proving that there is an “amount” for purposes of the gross income definition is 
on the C:SARS, and the mere fact that an amount is difficult to determine 
does not mean that there is not an amount.26 
 
In CIR v Delfos27 it was held that an asset should have ascertainable money 
value and should be able to be converted into money.28 The SCA held in 
C:SARS v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd and others29 that the right to 
retain and use an interest-free loan had a money value, and that the value of 
such right should be included in the gross income of the taxpayer for the 
years in which such rights accrued.30 The Delfos – principle was further 
expanded in the Brummeria – case, and in the obiter dicta it was said that an 
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 WH Lategan v CIR (1926) 2 SATC 16 at 19. Confirmed by Hefer JA. in CIR v People’s Stores (Walvis 
Bay) (Pty) Ltd (1990) 52 SATC 9 at 19.  
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 CIR v Butcher Bros (Pty) Ltd (1945) 13 SATC 21. 
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 (1933) 6 SATC 92. 
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 At 99. 
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 (2007) 69 SATC 205. 
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 At 212. 
amount did not have to be turned into money, but merely had to be in the form 
of an asset which objectively could be turned into money should it be sold.31 
 
5.1.2 Received by or accrued to or in favour of 
 
In Geldenhuys v CIR32 it was held that “received by” means to be received by 
the taxpayer on his own behalf for his own benefit.33 The courts accepted the 
principle that an amount “accrued to” a taxpayer when he has become entitled 
to such amount in WH Lategan v CIR34. In a later case, the court was divided 
with regards to the meaning of this phrase, but the majority confirmed the 
principle laid down in the Lategan – case.35 De Villiers JA. and Stratford JA. 
were however of the view that “accrued to” meant to become “due and 
payable”. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court finally concluded on 
this uncertainty and held that the meaning which should be afforded to 
“accrued to” is when an amount has become unconditionally due and the 
taxpayer has become entitled to it, thereby confirming the Lategan – 
principle.36 
 
It should be noted that the presence of a benefit is not a test for determining 
whether an amount should be included in gross income.37 
 
5.1.3 Capital versus revenue 
 
The courts have over the years given guidance and a variety of tests or 
guidelines have been developed to determine whether a particular receipt or 
accrual is of a capital or revenue nature.  
 
In Lace Proprietary Mines Ltd v CIR38, the court held that income is the result 
of the productive use of capital employed to earn profits.39 Generally it is 
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 Ochberg v CIR (1931) 5 SATC 93. 
found that “income” is produced through the employment of “capital”, or it is 
something in the nature of interest (fruit) arising from the principal (tree).40  
 
The intention of the taxpayer is of importance in determining the capital or 
revenue nature of a receipt or accrual.41 The taxpayer’s intention in this 
context means the aim or actual purpose of the taxpayer with regard to the 
amount received or accrued.42 It was held by Smalberger JA. in the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court, in CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share 
Purchase Trust that:43  
 
Contemplation is not to be confused with intention in the above sense. In a tax 
case one is not concerned with what possibilities, apart from his actual 
purpose, the taxpayer foresaw and with which he reconciled himself. One is 
solely concerned with his object, his aim, his actual purpose. 
 
The test for determining the intention of the taxpayer is subjective, and 
involves an enquiry into the taxpayer’s ipse dixit, i.e. what the taxpayer 
professes his/her/its intention to be.44 The courts will not merely accept the 
taxpayer’s view of what his/her/its intention was, but will infer the taxpayer’s 
intention from all the surrounding circumstances relating to the specific 
transaction.45 In CIR v Middelman46 the court held that although due 
consideration and weight must be given to the taxpayer’s ipse dixit, it must be 
considered against the probabilities and objective facts. 
 
The application of another test, the “scheme of profit making test”, also 
requires an enquiry into the intention of the taxpayer. This test has two 
characteristics, i.e. the activities must qualify as a business activity and it must 
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be performed in carrying out a scheme of profit making.47 It was held in the 
Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust – case that both of these 
elements should be present before this test can be applied and income can 
be classified as being revenue in nature. In C:SARS v Wyner48 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal emphasized that the scheme of profit making element should 
be considered in isolation, and that a business activity includes a single 
transaction, not invoked in the carrying out of a business, but of a business or 
commercial nature. An activity can be ascertained as qualifying as a business 
activity by applying reasonable and business standards.49 Therefore, to the 
extent that it is the intention of a taxpayer that amounts earned should form 
part of a scheme of profit-making, such amounts will normally be regarded as 
being revenue in nature and taxable in the hands of the taxpayer. 
 
It is submitted that the recurrence of a receipt or accrual may be an indication 
that the amount, in cash or otherwise, is not fortuitous and that it is designedly 
sought for and worked for.50 
 
5.1.4 Conclusion on section 1 gross income definition 
 
The essential elements of the gross income definition that should be met in 
the context of payments or benefits made by a lessor to a lessee are whether 
such amounts have been received by or accrued to the lessee and whether it 
is capital or revenue in nature. The additional element that should be met 
where the lessor agrees to receive reduced or no rental payments from the 
lessee, is whether such benefit constitutes “an amount in cash or otherwise”.  
 
The writer could not find any South African case law that deals with the nature 
of payments received by a lessee from a lessor as inducement for entering 
into a lease agreement. This is surprising, as these types of payments are 
becoming regular occurrences in practice, specifically in the context of new 
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developments where lessors need to attract anchor tenants. Leading 
Australian and New Zealand case law will be discussed below, that 
specifically dealt with rent inducement payments received by a lessee from a 
lessor. Although international case law has no binding effect in South Africa, 
they may be valuable and very well influence South African courts. 
International case law should nevertheless be cautiously approached due to 
the differences in the basis of taxation in countries.51 
 
5.2 Section 8(4)(a) – Recoupment of allowances previously claimed 
 
Section 8(4)(a) provides as follows: 
 
There shall be included in the taxpayer’s income all amounts allowed to be 
deducted or set off under the provisions of sections 11 to 20...whether in the 
current or any previous year of assessment which have been recovered or 
recouped during the current year of assessment... (Emphasis added) 
 
Taxability in terms of section 8(4)(a) is only to recovery or recoupment and 
these words should be given a wide meaning.52 It has been held that the word 
“recoup” means to recover or get back what has been expended, lost or paid, 
or to compensate.53 The purpose of section 8(4)(a) is to ensure that a 
deduction of expenditure was allowed once, and that a taxpayer should not 
escape taxation if such expenditure was not expensed at all (as a result of it 
being recouped), whether or not the liability to pay was legally terminated or 
not.54 It is also not necessary that the amount included in income, should be 
revenue in nature, as this is not a requirement of section 8(4)(a).55 It will 
therefore not matter whether the payments or benefits received from the 
lessor is capital or revenue in nature in the hands of the lessee.56 The mere 
fact that the lessee will be reimbursed for expenditure incurred will result in a 
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recoupment for income tax purposes. There should thus be a link between the 
receipt and expenditure incurred to determine whether there is indeed a 
recoupment for purposes of section 8(4)(a), i.e. there must have been a 
reduction in the expenditure claimed. The lessee should therefore be 
compensated for expenditure incurred and a deduction in respect of such 
expenditure should be claimed.  
 
Section 8(4)(a) does not address the situation where an upfront tenant 
installation allowance or rent inducement payment is received by the lessee, 
prior to any expenditure being incurred and prior to any leasehold 
improvements allowances being claimed. On a strict reading of section 
8(4)(a), it only provides for a recoupment of allowances claimed during the 
current and previous years of assessment, and not for any future allowances. 
It is therefore submitted that there can be no recoupment in terms of section 
8(4)(a) where the payment or benefit is received from the lessor prior to the 
lessee incurring expenditure and claiming an allowance.  
 
6 Types of amounts receivable by the lessee 
 
6.1 Rent inducement payments 
 
As noted above, no South African case law could be found that deals with rent 
inducement payments and the nature of rent inducement payments will thus 
be discussed with reference to international case law. 
 
In Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Cooling57 the Federal Court of 
Australia had to decide whether an incentive payment made by a lessor to a 
lessee, should be included in the taxable income of the lessee. This case 
involved a firm of solicitors who received an offer from a lessor to relocate its 
practice to new premises. The firm was not required to, but expensed the 
cash payment on leasehold improvements. Cooling, one of the partners of the 
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firm disclosed his share of the incentive payment in his return as not taxable. 
The court concluded that the payment constituted income and is accordingly 
taxable in the hands of the taxpayer.58  
 
Hill J. held as follows:59 
 
Where a taxpayer operates from leased premises, the move from one 
premises to another and the leasing of the premises occupied are acts of the 
taxpayer in the course of its business activity just as much as the trading 
activities that give rise more directly to the taxpayer's assessable income. 
 
...Why then should a profit received during the course of business where the 
making of such a profit was an ordinary incident of part of the business 
activity of the firm not be seen to be income in ordinary concepts? (Emphasis 
added) 
 
It was also held that it is possible to have a scheme of profit-making even if 
the sole or dominant purpose of entering into a transaction was not to make 
profit.60 A common sense approach was applied and it was held that the firm 
entered into a commercial transaction (conclusion of the lease agreement) 
that formed part its business activities, and the obtaining of a commercial 
profit by way of the incentive payment was a significant purpose of this 
transaction.61  
 
The New Zealand Privy Council also had to assess the income tax nature of a 
similar receipt for the first time in CIR v Wattie.62 The taxpayers were 
representatives of an accounting firm and negotiated new leased premises 
during the early 1990’s, when owners and developers of buildings were 
anxious to secure anchor tenants, and were prepared to enter into 
negotiations to attract such tenants. The firm was aware that it could be an 
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anchor tenant and that it had bargaining power and could expect significant 
incentive offers from lessors. It was offered a substantial lump sum 
inducement payment of $5 million, which effectively reduced its rental 
payments. In the partnership’s income tax return, the $5 million inducement 
payment was disclosed as a capital receipt.  
 
The Commissioner disputed the income tax treatment of the $5 million 
inducement payment. The Privy Council held that the $5 million receipt did not 
arise from the firm’s normal business operations,63 and that the payment 
could not be regarded as arising from an ordinary incident of firm’s business. 
The Cooling – decision was rejected and it was held that this decision should 
not be followed in New Zealand.64  
 
The Privy Council agreed with the submission by the firm that the inducement 
payment was of the same nature as a lease premium which is normally 
capital, except that a lease premium is a payment made by a lessee to a 
lessor.65 The Privy Council continued that the inducement payment was in this 
case paid by the lessor to the lessee as consideration for undertaking an 
onerous lease for a substantial period, and that the payment was a “mirror 
image” of a lease premium (also referred to as “a negative lease premium”).66  
 
On an appeal from the Full Federal Court of Australia to the High Court of 
Australia, the nature of an inducement payment was again the subject under 
review in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Montgomery67. This case also 
involved a firm of solicitors of which the taxpayer was a partner. The firm 
initially leased two buildings and effected extensive improvements to one of 
the leased buildings. Shortly thereafter, the lessor informed the firm that it 
intended to clear all of its buildings from asbestos and that it was envisaged 
that this operation could extend over three or more years. The firm could not 
occupy the buildings while the work was carried out and therefore had to 
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relocate. Various options were considered and the firm ultimately accepted an 
offer to enter into a new lease agreement for a period of 12 years. Another 
agreement was entered into that provided for an inducement payment of 
approximately $30 million payable to the firm over a three year period, as 
consideration for the firm entering into the lease agreement. The firm applied 
the first tranche of payment towards “fit-out” costs for the new premises, and 
also incurred substantial costs for the termination of its earlier lease and 
relocation to the new premises. 
 
The Federal Court of Australia68 found that the inducement payment was 
revenue in nature and subject to income tax. The ratio decidendi of the 
decision by Jenkinson J. was that the payment was consideration for the firm 
entering into the new lease agreement and that it was received by the firm in 
the course of carrying on its business.69 The court a quo therefore confirmed 
the earlier Cooling – decision. 
 
The taxpayer appealed to the Full Federal Court of Australia70 who held in 
separate judgements that the inducement payments did not constitute 
ordinary business income of the firm, and was therefore not taxable.71 Heerey 
J. rejected the Cooling – decision72 and concurred with the principle laid down 
in the Wattie – case. The distinction drawn between a lease premium and 
inducement payment was however rejected and it was held that the 
inducement payment is a payment made by the lessor to the lessee, and that 
such payment is capital in nature. Davies J. held that the conclusion of the 
lease agreement was an activity relating to the structure of the firm’s 
business, and that the inducement payment was a once and for all amount 
that arose from a capital transaction involving the lease.73 He went on to say 
that there was no evidence that the firm was involved in a scheme of profit 
making, and if the substantial costs of terminating the earlier lease and 
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relocation were taken into account, the firm did not make any profit. Lockhart 
J. distinguished the facts of the present case from the Cooling – case in that 
the firm in the present case was required to relocate due to a statement made 
by the lessor (clearing all of its buildings from asbestos), and that such 
relocation was not initiated by the lessee as in Cooling.  
 
The Commissioner appealed to the High Court of Australia, where a four to 
three majority, found that the inducement payment was revenue in nature and 
subject to income tax. The court confirmed the conclusion reached in the 
Cooling – case, but based its decision on a more general approach by 
applying basic capital versus revenue principles. It was held that the receipts 
did not add to the firm’s “profit-yielding structure”, and that the lease was 
acquired as part of their “profit-yielding structure”, while the inducement 
payment was not. The court also rejected the analogy between an 
inducement payment and lease premium, by making the following distinction 
between these concepts:74 
 
A lessee who pays a premium for a lease obtains the advantage of the lease 
and that lease may well form part of the profit-yielding structure of the 
lessee's business. The amount outlaid as premium would, in those 
circumstances, be outlaid on capital account. But an amount received by a 
lessee on agreeing to take a lease is not necessarily of the same character 
even if the lease is properly regarded as being part of the profit-yielding 
structure of the lessee's business. 
 
It is interesting to note that the majority of the court agreed with the taxpayer’s 
contention that the lease agreement which gave rise to the inducement 
payment, did not form part of the firm’s ordinary course of business.75 This 
conclusion was reached by looking into previous leases and sub-leases 
entered into by the firm and the fact that no inducement payments were 
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previously received by the firm (something that was not considered in the 
Cooling – case76).  
 
As the purpose of a rent inducement payment is to attract a lessee to enter 
into a lease agreement, it is submitted that there is no link between the rent 
inducement payment received by the lessee and any improvements costs 
incurred. To the extent that there is a link between the receipt and the 
expenditure incurred, it is submitted that the receipt would be more in the 
nature of a tenant installation allowance (refer to discussion in 6.2). Where the 
lessee thus incurs improvements costs, it will be entitled to claim a leasehold 
improvements allowance in terms of section 11(g). Furthermore, as there is 
no reimbursement of the improvements costs incurred, there should be no 
recoupment for purposes of section 8(4)(a), when a rent inducement payment 
is received by a lessee.  
 
The rent inducement payment will also not have any CGT implications, as a 
disposal77 is required to trigger a CGT event, and it is submitted that there is 
no disposal for CGT purposes upon receipt of the rent inducement payment, 
although there may be proceeds78 for CGT purposes with no base cost79.  
 
6.2 Reimbursement of improvements costs incurred by the lessee 
(tenant installation allowance) 
 
The lessor can reimburse the lessee for improvements costs incurred either 
by way of an upfront lump-sum tenant installation allowance or upon 
completion of the improvements, or by making direct payments to third party 
contractors when the improvements are effected. 
 
Where the lessee receives a tenant installation allowance from the lessor and 
is contractually obliged to utilise the amount for purposes of effecting the 
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improvements, there is an amount in cash, for purposes of the gross income 
definition. It will however have to be determined whether the cash amount is 
received by or accrued to the lessee, and whether it is capital or revenue in 
nature.  
 
It is uncertain whether the lessee will “receive” a tenant installation allowance 
on its own behalf and for its own benefit, as the amount was provided for a 
specific purpose, i.e. to effect improvements. It would however still need to be 
considered whether the cash amount “accrued to” the lessee. It was held that 
“accrued to” means that the taxpayer should be unconditionally entitled to the 
amount,80 which will be the case when a tenant installation allowance is paid 
by the lessor, based thereon that the lessee will become unconditionally 
entitled to the cash amount as soon as it incurs the improvements costs.  
 
In order to determine the capital or revenue nature of the amount, due 
consideration should be given to the intention of the lessee against the 
probabilities and objective facts.81 A further test which may assist in 
determining the intention of the lessee is the scheme of profit making test. 
Firstly, it would have to be considered whether the tenant installation 
allowance qualifies as a business activity, and secondly whether the amount 
was acquired as part of a scheme of profit making.82 The recurrence of the 
tenant installation allowance is not a decisive factor, but may be an important 
factor. It would also need to be considered whether the tenant installation 
allowance was designedly sought for and worked for by the lessee or whether 
it was merely a fortuitous receipt.83 A conclusive answer regarding the nature 
of a tenant installation allowance can only be provided once the terms of the 
(lease) agreement and the intention of the lessee have been considered. 
(Refer to Case Study 2 for the application of these guidelines to facts.) 
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The lessee will be entitled to claim a leasehold improvements allowance in 
terms of section 11(g), to the extent that all the requirements have been met. 
Where the lessee enters into agreements with third party contractors in its 
own name, it will have an unconditional liability for payment, as these 
contractors can legally demand payment of their accounts. The fact that the 
lessee will utilise the tenant installation allowance to incur the improvements 
costs, will not change the fact that expenditure has been incurred, as the 
tenant installation allowance is merely a method of settlement.84 It is therefore 
submitted that the lessee will be entitled to claim a leasehold improvements 
allowance in terms of section 11(g), to the extent that the other requirements 
of section 11(g) are met.  
 
The final matter for consideration is whether the tenant installation allowance 
will result in a recoupment of section 11(g) allowances claimed. The writer’s 
findings are set out below: 
 
• Upfront tenant installation allowance or direct payments to service 
providers – There is an anomaly between section 11(g) and section 
8(4)(a), where an upfront lump-sum tenant installation allowance is 
received by or accrues to the lessee. Say, the tenant installation 
allowance is received in year 1. A section 11(g) allowance may only be 
claimed during the year of assessment in which the leasehold 
improvements have been completed, e.g. year 3. During year 1 when 
there is a reimbursement of the improvements costs, no allowance have 
been claimed and section 8(4)(a) does not refer to allowances claimed in 
future years of assessment. It is therefore submitted that there can be no 
recoupment of section 11(g) leasehold improvements allowances, for 
purposes of section 8(4)(a). 
 
• Tenant installation allowance upon completion of improvements – The 
applicability of section 8(4)(a) will depend on the timing of the receipt or 
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accrual, i.e. whether it is received before or after section 11(g) allowances 
have been claimed. To the extent that it is received before any allowances 
have been claimed, the same principles discussed above will apply, and 
there will be no recoupment in terms of section 8(4)(a). Where the tenant 
installation allowance is however received after the lessee has 
commenced with the claiming of section 11(g) leasehold improvements 
allowances, the allowances claimed in the year of such receipt and any 
previous years of assessments, would have to be included in the lessee’s 
taxable income. The section 11(g) leasehold improvements allowances 
claimed in the future years of assessment will in the writer’s view not fall 
within the ambit of section 8(4)(a), as the wording of this provision does 
not make provision for such circumstances.  
 
6.3 Reduced or no rental payments 
 
There may also be instances where the lessor agrees to receive reduced 
rental payments or no rental payments from the lessee, either as 
reimbursement of improvements costs incurred by the lessee or as 
inducement for the lessee for entering into the lease agreement.  
 
Although the lessee does not receive a tangible asset or cash, it will receive a 
benefit. The presence of a benefit is however not a test for determining 
whether an amount should be included in the lessee’s gross income.85 It is 
submitted that there is an “amount in cash or otherwise”, as an “amount” 
includes every form of corporeal or incorporeal property, which has a money 
value.86 It was further held that where a right has a money value, then the 
value of such right should be included in the gross income of a taxpayer.87 
The benefit will also accrue to the lessee as it will become unconditional 
entitled thereto in terms of the lease agreement, upon incurring the leasehold 
improvements costs. The only issue for consideration is therefore whether 
such benefit is capital or revenue in nature. It is submitted that the intention of 
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the lessee upon accrual of the benefit should be assessed, by looking at the 
purpose with which the lessor grants the benefit. 
 
If the purpose of the concession in rental payments is to induce the lessee to 
enter into the lease agreement, it is submitted that the benefit will be in the 
nature of a rent inducement payment (refer to discussion in 6.1). To the extent 
that the concession in rental payments is however to reimburse the lessee for 
incurring leasehold improvements costs, the benefit will assume the nature of 
a tenant installation allowance (refer to discussion in 6.2). In this instance, it is 
however important to consider the legal principle of “set-off”, i.e. can the rental 
payments legally be set-off against the improvements costs? Set-off legally 
means that one debt is cancelled by another and it can only take place when 
debts are mutually owed by two persons, i.e. each person is simultaneously 
the debtor and creditor.88 There can however be no set-off of the rental 
payments against the improvements costs, as both obligations89 will be due 
by the lessee. In the absence of corresponding obligations by the lessee and 
lessor, the concession granted by the lessor for rental payments will not affect 
the availability of a leasehold improvements allowance in terms of section 
11(g) for the lessee. The lessee will therefore actually have incurred 
expenditure, and provided the expenditure is incurred in pursuance of an 
obligation in terms of the lease agreement and the property is used for the 
production of income, the lessee will qualify for an allowance in terms of 
section 11(g).  
 
It is further submitted that the lessor’s waiver of the claim for rental payments, 
resulting in the lessee being relieved from the obligation to make rental 
payments, will result in a recoupment in terms of section 8(4)(m). The lessee 
will be entitled to a deduction of the rental payments in terms of section 11(a) 
as expenditure will be actually incurred due to the unconditional liability to 
make rental payments in terms of the lease agreements. In terms of section 
8(4)(m), the lessee will be deemed to have recovered an amount equal to the 
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 Firstly, the obligation to make rental payments to the lessor, and secondly the obligation to effect 
obligation from which it was relieved during the year of assessment, i.e. the 
amount of the rental payments that was not paid90 and claimed as a 
deduction91 in terms of section 11(a).  
 
6.4 South African authorities 
 
According to Clegg, D, the principle that can be extracted from the Cooling – 
case is that the act of entering into a new lease agreement is an unavoidable 
consequence of carrying on a trade, and any related receipt will therefore be 
revenue in nature and subject to income tax.92 Clegg, D.93 is further of the 
view that the basic principles laid down by courts over the years with regards 
to the “gross income” definition should be considered, i.e. the essence of 
trading operations,94 the fortuitous receipt test95 and asking the question of 
which hole is being filled96. Clegg, D. concludes that each individual case 
should be looked at on its own merits by considering whether the lessee has 
attempted to induce the inducement payment and actively intervened or 
suggested such payment. A noteworthy point mentioned by Clegg, D. is that it 
does not matter if the taxpayer received a number of inducement payments 
from different lessors on different occasions, as long as the offer of payment 
is made by the lessor, the receipt should be capital in nature.97 
 
Meyerowitz98 is of the view that a South African court would follow the Privy 
Council’s approach in the event that it is faced with similar facts as in the 
Wattie – case, and that an inducement payment would be regarded capital in 
nature for South African income tax purposes. Meyerowitz goes further by 
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stating that a portion of the rental payments would not have been deductible 
in terms of section 11(a) and 23(g), based thereon that a portion of the rental 
payable would not have been incurred in the production of income or laid out 
for purposes of trade, but for purposes of obtaining a capital amount.  
 
Croome, B.99 disagrees with Meyerowitz’s view by confirming that the South 
African income tax is rooted in the New South Wales legislation, and that a 
South African court is therefore more likely to rely on the Australian decision. 
He goes further to say that the income tax treatment of an inducement 
payment is not free from doubt and careful consideration should be given as 
to how a lease agreement is drafted and the true nature of such payment. 
According to Croome, B.100 the likely outcome in South African courts is that 
inducement payments received by a lessee from a lessor will be a revenue 
receipt that would be fully taxable, as the lessee is receiving the amount for 
exploiting its goodwill and is not sterilising or disposing of a part of its 
business. In a subsequent article by Croome, B.101 the decision handed down 
by the Federal Court of Australia in O’Connell v Federal Commission of 
Taxation102 is analysed. The court confirmed the decisions in Cooling and 
Montgomery, i.e. that the inducement payment was revenue in nature and 
consequently subject to income tax. The court took the view that the lessee 
exploited its goodwill in obtaining the inducement payment and that the 
payment formed part of its trading activities. The court also held that the fact 
that the transaction was isolated did not preclude the receipt from being 
revenue in nature, as the taxpayer intended to make a profit or gain from the 
transaction.  
 
The writer is firstly of the view that South African courts will not draw an 
analogy between a rent inducement payment and a lease premium, as it is a 
well established principle in South African tax law that a lease premium is 
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“consideration passing from a lessee to a lessor, whether in cash or 
otherwise, distinct from and in addition tom or in lieu of rent”103. Secondly, 
although the writer agrees that a single transaction is not a decisive factor in 
determining the nature of an inducement payment, it is submitted that a South 
African court will attach more weight to this consideration, as it may be 
indicative of the lessee’s intention. Furthermore, in terms of the “gross 
income” definition principles, an amount will be regarded as revenue in nature 
to the extent that it was designedly sought for and worked for, is not merely a 
fortuitous receipt and is part of a scheme of profit making, and these tests 
should be applied to the facts of each case.104  
 
The writer is of the view that if a similar set of facts as noted in the cases 
above would come before a South African court, the relevant circumstances 
that led to the rent inducement payment as well as the structuring of the lease 
agreement would have to be carefully considered to assess the treatment of 
such amount for income tax purposes. There is no definite answer regarding 
the revenue or capital nature of such receipt, notwithstanding the international 
case law noted above. The test should be whether the lessee would still have 
entered into the lease agreement, notwithstanding the rent inducement 
payment, i.e. the intention of the lessee. The receipt will in the writer’s view be 
regarded as part of the lessee’s scheme of profit making where, for example, 
a large retailer leases property in a new development knowing that it will 
receive a rent inducement payment due to its name and brand, or where a 
retailer concludes the lease agreement for purposes of receiving the rent 




The nature of the payment or benefit from a lessor to a lessee is important to 
determine whether a lessee will be entitled to claim a leasehold improvements 
allowance in terms of section 11(g), and whether there will be a recoupment 
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of such allowance in terms of section 8(4)(a). The distinction between a rent 
inducement payment and tenant installation allowance will depend on the 
specific circumstances of each case, how these receipts are defined in the 
(lease) agreement, and whether the agreement draws a clear link between 
the receipt and improvements costs incurred. Where the lessor agrees to 
receive reduced rental payments or no rental payments, the purpose of such 
concession should be determined in order to assess whether the benefit will 
be in the nature of a tenant installation allowance or rent inducement payment 
in the hands of the lessee. 
 
Where there is a clear link between the leasehold improvements costs 
incurred by the lessee and the payment or benefit paid by the lessor, which 
indicates that the receipt constitutes a reimbursement of the costs incurred, 
the lessee will in the writer’s view be entitled to claim a section 11(g) 
allowance, provided that all the requirements of section 11(g) are met. It will 
however need to be considered whether there is a recoupment for income tax 
purposes. Where there is no link between the payment or benefit paid by the 
lessor, and the leasehold improvements costs incurred by the lessee, the 
lessee will also be entitled to a leasehold improvements allowance in terms of 
section 11(g), and there can be no recoupment for income tax purposes in 
terms of section 8(4)(a), due to the absence of a link between the payment 
received and the costs incurred.  
 
In light of the above, the writer is of the view that the following factors should 
be considered when assessing the income tax treatment of the receipt in the 
hands of the lessee, as well as the availability of the leasehold improvements 
allowance in terms of section 11(g): 
 
• Was the negotiating of the payment or benefit, in cash or otherwise, at the 
insistence of the lessee or lessor? 
 
• If at the instance of the lessee, was it a once-off occurrence or does it 
form part of the lessee’s standard lease agreement negotiations?  
 • The intention of the lessee when receiving the payment or benefit from 
the lessor (the purpose with which the lessor makes the payment to the 
lessee may be indicative of the lessee’s intention). 
 
• Are there any conditions attached to the payment or benefit from the 
lessor, or is the lessee free to utilise the amount for any purpose? 
 
• Can a link be established between the payment or benefit, and the costs 
incurred in respect of the leasehold improvements, in terms of the lease- 
or other agreement? 
 
• Where the cash amount or benefit is specifically paid by the lessor for 
purposes of effecting leasehold improvements to the leased property, are 
the agreements with the contractors in the name of the lessee or lessor, 
and does the lessee or lessor make the payments to the contractors? 
 
The writer reiterates that there are no hard and fast rules and no definitive 
answer regarding the nature of these types of payments or benefits in the 
hands of the lessee. All of the surrounding circumstances and facts would 
need to be assessed, and it is recommended that the parties ensure that the 
terms of the (lease) agreement clearly state the purpose of the payment. It is 
also recommended that the parties clearly record their negotiations leading to 
the conclusion of the lease agreement (and other relevant agreement). 
 
7 Case studies 
 
7.1 Case study 1: Lessee receives a cash rent inducement payment 
 
7.1.1 Background information 
 
ABC (Pty) Ltd (“ABC” or “the lessee”) is a large clothing retailer in South 
Africa, and concludes a lease agreement with XYZ Developments (Pty) Ltd 
(“XYZ” or “the lessor”). ABC is given the right to use floor space in a new 
shopping mall owned by XYZ for a period of 5 years with an option to renew 
the lease for a further 5 years.  
 
Prior to concluding the lease agreement, XYZ approached ABC and offered it 
an amount of R8 million to enter into the lease agreement. ABC has never 
received such a rent inducement payment. Prior to XYZ approaching ABC, 
ABC was planning to expand its business operations to the area in which the 
new shopping mall was erected.  
 
XYZ is aware that ABC would have to customize the floor space in the 
shopping mall to comply with its brand standards, but XYZ does not have the 
upfront cash to do this itself. The lease agreement provides that ABC is 
obliged to effect the leasehold improvements at its own cost. No amount is 
stipulated in the lease agreement. ABC and XYZ are both taxpaying entities. 
 
The following matters should be considered: 
 
• Will the rent inducement payment received by ABC be taxable in its 
hands? 
 
• Will ABC be entitled to claim a leasehold improvements allowance in 
terms of section 11(g)? 
 
7.1.2 Income tax treatment of the rent inducement payment105  
 
The first two elements of the gross income definition have been met, as ABC 
received a cash amount from XYZ. The only matter for consideration is 
therefore whether the receipt is capital or revenue in nature. The nature of the 
rent inducement payment should be determined by considering the intention 
of ABC, as inferred from the surrounding circumstances and facts relating to 
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this specific transaction. It was not ABC’s intention to enter into the lease 
agreement, only to receive the rent inducement payment. The rent 
inducement payment was offered by XYZ and was not paid at the insistence 
of ABC. This indicates that the receipt was not designedly sought for and 
worked for and was merely a fortuitous receipt. Although not a decisive factor, 
the fact that it is the first time that ABC received this type of payment is 
indicative that the receipt is revenue in nature. It is also submitted that the rent 
inducement payment does not form part of ABC’s scheme of profit making, as 
the receipt thereof was not the sole or main consideration for entering into the 
lease agreement. It was ABC’s intention to commence business operations in 
that specific area, i.e. the lease agreement would have been concluded with 
or without the rent inducement payment.  
 
Based on the above circumstances, the rent inducement payment is capital in 
nature, and the amount will not be subject to income tax in the hands of ABC. 
There will also not be any CGT consequences for ABC upon receipt of the 
rent inducement payment as there is no disposal for CGT purposes. 
 
Note: The rent inducement payment would have been revenue in nature and 
subject to income tax in the hands of ABC where it actively sought lessors 
who offer rent inducement payments to large traders with reputable names. A 
further factor that would have made the rent inducement payment revenue in 
nature and part of ABC’s scheme of profit making is where ABC enters into 
the lease agreement only to obtain the rent inducement payment, and 
subsequently sub-leases the property. 
 
7.1.3 Entitlement to leasehold improvements allowance106 
 
The rent inducement payment was paid by XYZ to ABC, independently from 
ABC’s obligation to effect leasehold improvements. The purpose of the 
payment was to induce ABC as large clothing retailer to be a tenant in the 
                                               
106
 Refer to 4 for a detailed discussion on the requirements of section 11(g), and to 6.1 for a discussion 
on the interaction between the rent inducement payment, section 11(g) and section 8(4)(a).  
new shopping mall. The conclusion of the lease agreement was to the 
advantage of XYZ and it was therefore prepared to make the rent inducement 
payment. In order for ABC to claim a leasehold improvements allowance in 
terms of section 11(g), there should be expenditure actually incurred in 
pursuance of an obligation to effect improvements to the leased property in 
terms of the lease agreement, and property should be used or occupied for 
the production of income.  
 
It is submitted that all the requirements of section 11(g) have been met, in 
that: 
 
• There is a lease agreement between ABC and XYZ; 
 
• There is an obligation on ABC to effect the improvements in terms of the 
lease agreement; 
 
• ABC actually incurred expenditure in pursuance of the obligation in terms 
of the lease agreement; 
 
• The leased property will be used and is occupied for the production of 
ABC’s income; and 
 
• The value of the improvements will be included in the income of XYZ. 
 
As the rent inducement payment and the leasehold improvements are not 
linked to each other in terms of the lease agreement, the rent inducement 
payment does not constitute a reimbursement of the improvement costs 
incurred by ABC. There will thus be no recoupment of section 11(g) 
allowances claimed, in terms of section 8(4)(a). To the extent that there is a 
link between the receipt and improvements costs, the receipt will assume the 
nature of a tenant installation allowance (refer to Case Study 2 below). 
 
ABC will be entitled to claim the fair and reasonable value of the leasehold 
improvements over the initial 5 year lease period (no amount specified in the 
lease agreement). The first section 11(g) allowance will be granted in the year 
of assessment during which the improvements are completed. 
 
7.2 Case study 2: Lessee is reimbursed for the leasehold 
improvements expenditure 
 
7.2.1 Background information 
 
JJ (Pty) Ltd (“JJ” or “the lessor”) concluded a lease agreement with EE (Pty) 
Ltd (“EE” or “the lessee”), in terms of which EE leases the property from JJ for 
a period of 10 years. Both JJ and EE are taxpaying entities. EE operates as a 
motor vehicle workshop and requires a specific layout and equipment prior to 
commencing its business. The buildings are in a satisfactory condition and 
there are no signs of damage or deterioration to the building, but they are not 
equipped for EE’s business operations.  
 
The lease agreement explicitly provides that the lease of the property is 
subject to specific improvements and alterations being effected by EE to the 
buildings. No amount is stated in the lease agreement as the value of the 
improvements. The lease agreement makes provision for improvements 
undertaken by EE at its own costs, subject to approval by JJ and towards 
which JJ contributes R15 million. EE received a tenant installation allowance 
once before, when its previous lessor granted such an allowance. The tenant 
installation allowance was however at the insistence of the lessors at both 
times. 
 
The lease agreement defines the contribution of R15 million from JJ to EE as 
a upfront lump-sum “tenant installation allowance” and states that this 
contribution should specifically be utilised by EE for purposes of effecting the 
required improvements. EE should therefore not use the tenant installation 
allowance for any other purposes. To the extent that the tenant installation 
allowance is not utilised for the improvements, EE should repay the full 
amount to JJ. Where a portion of the tenant installation allowance remains 
after all the required improvements have been effected, EE should repay the 
balance to JJ. EE enters into the contracts with the respective contractors in 
its own name. 
 
The following matters should be considered: 
 
• Will the R15 million tenant installation allowance received by EE be 
taxable in its hands? 
 
• Will the improvements costs incurred by EE qualify for a leasehold 
improvements allowance in terms of section 11(g), in light of the fact that 
JJ paid a tenant installation allowance to EE? 
 
• Will EE be entitled to a section 11(g) leasehold improvements allowance 
to the extent that the improvements costs are for its own costs without any 
contributions from JJ (where the improvements costs are in excess of 
R15 million)? 
 
7.2.2 Income tax treatment of tenant installation allowance107   
 
The first element of the gross income definition has been met. The last two 
elements of the definition should thus be considered further, i.e. whether the 
amount was received by or accrued to EE and whether it is capital or revenue 
in nature. 
 
It appears that JJ is effectively paying for the improvements to the leased 
property through the tenant installation allowance. EE receives a benefit from 
the tenant installation allowance through the improvements to the leased 
property, which will enable it to commence its business operations. The 
presence of a benefit is however not a test for determining whether an amount 
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should be included in gross income. The tenant installation allowance has 
been received by EE on its own behalf and for its own benefit. This element of 
the gross income definition has therefore been satisfied. The requirement is 
that the amount should be “received by or accrued to” (emphasis added) the 
taxpayer and it is therefore submitted that it is not necessary to consider 
whether the amount accrued to EE. EE will however become unconditionally 
entitled to the amount upon incurring the improvements costs. 
 
It is further submitted that the tenant installation allowance received by EE is 
capital in nature, based on the intention of EE, in light of the surrounding 
circumstances and objective facts relating to this transaction. EE received the 
tenant installation allowance as reimbursement for the improvements costs 
incurred. The tenant installation allowance was paid at the insistence of JJ, 
and was therefore a fortuitous receipt for EE. Although EE received a tenant 
installation allowance once before, it was offered by different lessors on 
different occasions. The receipt of the tenant installation allowance also does 
not form part of EE’s scheme of profit making, and it was not designedly 
sought for and worked for in the course of EE’s normal business operations. It 
is submitted that the main object of the receipt was to reimburse the lessee for 
the cost incurred in effecting the leasehold improvements, and not for the 
lessee to make a profit.  
 
Note: To the extent that it can be proved that the tenant installation allowance 
was paid at the instance of EE and EE regularly negotiates for these types of 
benefits, then such receipts will be regarded as being revenue in nature. 
 
7.2.3 Entitlement to leasehold improvements allowance108 
 
EE has an explicit obligation in terms of the lease agreement to effect the 
improvements to the leased building. The fact that the lessee is reimbursed 
for the improvements costs incurred, will not affect its obligation to effect the 
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leasehold improvements in terms of the lease agreement. The only issue 
remaining is whether the leasehold improvement expenditure has been 
actually incurred by EE.  
 
To the extent that EE incurs expenditure relating to the improvements, and is 
reimbursed through the tenant installation allowance, it is submitted that JJ is 
effectively paying for the improvements. There is however a difference 
between incurring expenditure and the settlement thereof. EE contracts 
directly with the contractors and is therefore unconditional liable for payment 
to the extent that the work are performed, and the fact that EE settles the 
costs by utilising the tenant installation allowance received from JJ, will not 
change this. Expenditure has therefore been actually incurred by EE for 
purposes of section 11(g). It will need to be considered whether there is a 
recoupment of the section 11(g) allowances claimed, to the extent that the 
tenant installation allowance is utilised to fund the improvements costs. The 
relevant consideration is whether there will be a recoupment for purposes of 
section 8(4)(a) where an upfront tenant installation allowance is received 
before any section 11(g) leasehold improvements allowances are claimed. EE 
will only be entitled to claim the first leasehold improvements allowance in 
terms of section 11(g) in the first year of assessment when the improvements 
are completed, and the recoupment of the expenditure (tenant installation 
allowance) will occur in an earlier year of assessment. On a strict reading of 
section 8(4)(a) there will be no recoupment of section 11(g) allowances. 
 
Where the leasehold improvements expenses exceed the tenant installation 
allowance of R15 million and EE effects that leasehold improvements at its 
own expense, EE will also have actually incurred expenses for purposes of 
section 11(g). Such expenditure will be incurred by EE is in pursuance of an 
obligation in terms of the lease agreement and the property will be used for 
the production of income. As JJ is a taxpaying entity, it will be taxed on the 
value of the leasehold improvements or the amount to be expended by EE, in 
the year of assessment in which the improvements have been completed.109 
EE will therefore be entitled to claim a leasehold improvements allowance in 
terms of section 11(g). 
 
The section 11(g) allowance will be calculated as equal annual instalments 
over the 10 year lease period of the lease agreement. The amount that EE 
may claim is limited to the amount specified in the lease agreement, as the 
value of the improvements. As no amount is stipulated in the lease 
agreement, the allowance will be based on an amount which in the opinion of 
the C:SARS represents the fair and reasonable value of the improvements. It 
is submitted that the tenant installation allowance of R15 million is not 
sufficient support for an amount stipulated in the lease agreement, to be 
expended by EE, for purposes of section 11(g). The leasehold improvements 
allowance will thus be based on the fair and reasonable value of the 
improvements.  
 
7.3 Case study 3: Lessee receives free use of the lease building for a 
specific period 
 
7.3.1 Background information 
 
Alpha (Pty) Ltd (“Alpha” or “the lessor”) concluded a lease agreement with 
Omega (Pty) Ltd (“Omega” or “the lessee”), in terms of which three buildings 
are leased to Omega for a period of 15 years. The lease agreement provides 
that Omega is under an obligation to refurbish and restore the leased 
buildings. Both parties are taxpaying entities. The agreement provides that the 
value of the improvements should be R10 million, which are for Omega’s own 
costs. 
 
The lease agreement provides for monthly rental payments, payable by 
Omega to Alpha as follow: 
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• Building A – R25 000; 
 
• Building B – R35 000; 
 
• Building C – R20 000 
 
The lease agreement provides that Omega will be liable for payment of the 
rental in respect of all the buildings, but that the rental payments will be set off 
against the improvements costs incurred by Omega. In terms of the lease 
agreement, this arrangement will continue until Omega has recovered all the 
improvements costs from Alpha. 
 
The following matters should be considered: 
 
• How should the concession in rental payments provided for in the lease 
agreement be treated in the hands of Omega, for income tax purposes? 
 
• Will Omega be entitled to deduct the rental payments in terms of section 
11(a)? 
 
• Will Omega be entitled to claim a leasehold improvements allowance in 
terms of section 11(g), in light of the fact that Alpha is agreeing to 
suspend all rental payments until all improvements costs have been 
reimbursed? 
 
7.3.2 Income tax treatment of benefit and the deductibility of rental 
payments110    
 
It is submitted that the first element of the gross income definition has met, as 
the benefit in the form of relief from the payment of rental payments, can be 
valued. The benefit in the present case is that Alpha waived its right to receive 
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rental payments, and it is submitted that this benefit can be valued at 
R80 000. Although the presence of a benefit is not a test for determining 
whether an “amount” should be included in Omega’s gross income, the 
“amount” in the form of relief from rental payment has accrued to Omega, and 
Omega became unconditionally entitled to the benefit in terms of the lease 
agreement. 
 
Finally, it will need to be considered whether the benefit is capital or revenue 
in nature. The concession in rental payment is granted by Alpha to reimburse 
Omega for the leasehold improvements costs that it incurs. It therefore 
appears that the benefit is rather in the nature of a recoupment for income tax 
purposes. For this reason, Omega’s entitlement to deduct the rental payments 
will first be considered. 
 
Omega will have an absolute and unconditional liability for payment of the 
rental payments of R80 000 during the year of assessment, as the lease 
agreement explicitly provides that Omega shall be liable for payment of rental 
for all the buildings. The lease agreement provides Omega as lessee with two 
distinct obligations, namely an obligation to make rental payments in the 
amount of R80 000 and an obligation to incur leasehold improvements 
expenditure. These obligations cannot legally be set-off against each other, as 
there are no corresponding obligations, i.e. both obligations are the 
obligations of Omega. As Alpha does not owe any debt to Omega, there can 
legally be no set-off of Omega’s obligations. The incurral of expenditure 
should not be confused with the settlement thereof, therefore once Omega 
incurred the rental payments, the fact that it chose to settle the payments by 
way of effecting the leasehold improvements, does not change this.  
 
Omega has thus actually incurred expenditure for purposes of section 11(a), 
and it is submitted that the rental payments were incurred in the production of 
income and rental payments are normally regarded as revenue in nature. The 
waiver by Alpha of the claim for rental payment will result in a recoupment of 
the section 11(a) deductions for rental payments in terms of section 8(4)(m). 
 
7.3.3 Entitlement to leasehold improvements allowance111 
 
The lease agreement places an obligation on Omega to effect the leasehold 
improvements at its own costs. Alpha is a taxpaying entity and the amount to 
be expended on the improvements as stipulated in the lease agreement (i.e. 
R10 million) will therefore be included in Alpha’s income. 
 
The only issue remaining is whether Omega will be regarded as having 
actually incurred the leasehold improvements in pursuance of an obligation in 
terms the lease agreement, as Alpha is agreeing to waive its claim to the 
rental payments, in order for Omega to recover all improvement costs. Alpha 
may therefore be regarded as effectively incurring the improvements costs 
through the waiver of rental payments. Omega has however incurred the 
leasehold improvements costs, based thereon that the costs are for its own 
costs, and the contractors rendering the services will be entitled to demand 
payment from Omega. Omega should therefore qualify for a leasehold 
improvements allowance in terms of section 11(g).  
 
The section 11(g) allowance will be calculated over the lease period of 15 
years, and is limited to the amount stipulated in the lease agreement as the 
value of the improvements, i.e. R10 million. The first allowance can only be 
claimed in the year of assessment during which the improvements have been 
completed. 
 
Due to the fact that there are two distinct obligations, namely to incur rental 
payments and to effect the leasehold improvements, it is submitted that the 
waiver of the rental payments by Alpha should be viewed separately from the 
obligation on Omega to incur leasehold improvements expenditure. The 
waiver of Alpha’s claim for rental payments does not constitute a 
reimbursement of the improvements costs incurred by Omega, and Omega 
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will not have to include any recoupment in its taxable income in terms of 




The objectives of this paper were to consider the requirements of section 
11(g) and the income tax consequences for the lessee where the lessor pays 
a cash amount or grants a benefit to the lessee, in cash or otherwise. The 
objectives were limited to the income tax consequences for the lessee.  
 
From the wording of section 11(g), the requirements are clear. It is however 
submitted that the practical application of section 11(g) may be problematic. 
Two conflicting cases dealing with the determination of a lessee’s obligation 
for purposes of section 11(g) were cited, and it is not clear whether or not the 
lessee’s obligation should be determined with reference to the lessor’s right to 
legally demand that the improvements be effected by the lessee. The 
conclusion reached was that the parties should explicitly provide for a clear 
and unambiguous obligation for the lessee to effect the leasehold 
improvements in a written lease agreement.  
 
The last objective was to conclude on the income tax treatment of payments 
or benefits, in cash or otherwise, paid or granted by the lessor to the lessee. 
This objective was reached by performing extensive research into the general 
principles and guidelines laid down by the South African courts in respect of 
the interpretation of the gross income definition, as well as section 8(4)(a). 
The research continued into a detailed consideration of leading international 
case law dealing with the nature of rent inducement payments and was 
complemented with comments from South African authors. The 
aforementioned principles and case law were applied to the scenarios 
identified, and various of factors were identified which should be taken into 
account when assessing the interaction between the income tax treatment of 
such amounts and benefits and improvement costs incurred by the lessee. 
The writer did not commit herself to a conclusive answer regarding this 
interaction due to the various factors which should be taken into account, 
including the structuring of the lease- or other agreement. 
 
In the final instance, this objective was illustrated by way of practical 
examples in case studies illustrating the interaction between section 11(g), the 
gross income definition and the recoupment provisions in section 8(4)(a).. 
 
It remains to be seen how South African courts will deal with, firstly the 
income tax nature of a rent inducement payment, tenant installation allowance 
or concession in rental payments received by or accrued to a lessee, and 
secondly the interaction between such receipt or accrual and a leasehold 
improvements allowance in terms of section 11(g). 
